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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78A-4- 103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A WD does not dispute SupraNaturals' statement of the three issues raised 
in its brief, but points out that Appellant's citation to the record refers to its notice 
of appeal only. SupraNaturals omits any citation to the trial court record where 
SupraNaturals allegedly preserved those issues for review. Additionally, AWD 
notes that SupraNaturals fails to state the grounds for this Court to review any of 
the issues not preserved in the trial court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AWD does not dispute the description of the standards of review stated by 
SupraNaturals on those issues it seeks to raise, namely, the trial court's factual 
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and whether a judgment 
is final under a correctness standard. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
Rules: 
1. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A): 
The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court... 
2. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A WD does not object to SupraNaturals' statement of the case, but adds the 
following material facts not previously mentioned, as follows: 
1. On September 5, 2008, the morning of the first day of trial, the 
parties reached an agreement regarding the presentation of evidence at trial. (R. at 
639; Tr. at pp. 3:24-25, 4:1-21). 
2. SupraNaturals presented the trial court with a set of Stipulated 
Facts, twenty in number, approved by A WD, conceding the substance of A WD's 
case in chief. (R. at 284-87). 
3. In particular, SupraNaturals stipulated that during May, 2005, it 
and AWD entered into a contract for AWD to perform services and in return 
SupraNaturals agreed to pay AWD certain sums. (R. at 286, % 6). 
4. The parties stipulated that the contract was valid and legally 
binding. (Id.) 
5. SupraNaturals stipulated that the contract provided that AWD 
was entitled to interest on unpaid amounts at the rate of one and one-half (1.5%) 
per month. (Id.,^ 8). 
6. SupraNaturals stipulated the contract provided that AWD was 
entitled to attorney fees and costs of court in the event SupraNaturals failed to pay 
amounts owed AWD for its labor and materials. (7d.,f9). 
7. SupraNaturals stipulated it failed to pay the amounts claimed owing 
2 
AWD.(R. at 285,1111). 
8. SupraNaturals stipulated the reasonable value of the unpaid 
services and materials provided by AWD, which improved the SupraNaturals 
Industrial Facility, was $286,054.02 subject to Defendants claim for setoff. (Id, ^ 
15). 
9. SupraNaturals stipulated to AWD's judgment, subject to 
SupraNaturals' counterclaim for setoff to "save [AWD] from having to put on all 
the basic facts and wasting [the trial court's] time because we agreed on it." (R. at 
639; Tr. at p. 4:19-21). (In short, SupraNaturals agreed AWD met its burden of 
proof—or that AWD would have met its burden of proof had it been required to 
present its case.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
SupraNaturals stipulated that AWD met its engineering burden under the 
parties contract by agreeing to all the facts necessary to support AWD's judgment 
on its claims subject only to SupraNaturals' claim for set off. Had SupraNaturals 
not dispensed with the taking of AWD's evidence by agreement, AWD would 
have met its burden of proof at trial. Consequently, when SupraNaturals failed to 
meet its burden of proof on its counterclaim, the trial court correctly entered 
judgment for AWD based upon the parties' stipulation. 
SupraNaturals failed to preserve the issue of AWD's engineering burden 
under the contract by not providing the trial court any opportunity to rule on that 
issue. SupraNaturals did not preserve the issue by objecting to the testimony of 
3 
AWD regarding the hiring of a licensed engineer. Also, SupraNaturals is not 
entitled to review on alternate grounds because it affirmatively invited AWD to 
forego presentation of all its evidence and represented the trial court could rely on 
the parties' stipulation to make its findings and conclusions. 
AWD takes no position on SupraNaturals challenge to the April 13,2009, 
post-trial supersedeas bond order as the date of the filing of the appeal has no 
bearing on the substantive issues on appeal. AWD does not assert that 
SupraNaturals' appeal is premature. In fact, the trial court did enter a subsequent 
order on May 19, 2009, in response to SupraNaturals' objection, affirming that a 
final judgment had entered on March 11, 2009. 
AWD is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal because it was 
awarded attorney's fees at the trial court level. 
ARGUMENT 
L SUPRANATURALS PREPARED STIPULATED FACTS 
SHOWING AWD MET ITS ENGINEERING BURDEN 
SUBJECT ONLY TO SETOFF BY SUPRANATURALS5 
COUNTERCLAIM 
It is a plaintiffs duty to press at trial the claims asserted in its complaint. 
Durfey v. Bd of Ed. of Wayne County, 604 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1979). The 
plaintiffs burden is met where the litigants, instead of assembling witnesses and 
putting on their proofs, reduce their respective rights and priorities to writing and 
stipulate that a decree may be entered in conformity thereto. United Factors v. 
T.C. Associates, Inc., 445 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1968). A stipulation has all the 
4 
binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon 
the evidence. It is an acknowledgment that all the facts necessary to support such 
contract and decree in conformity thereto pre-existed and would be sustained by 
available evidence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking 
of evidence. Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 80P.2d458, 
467 (Utah 1938). In the present case, SupraNaturals stipulated to facts supporting 
AWD's claim for payment under the contract. (R. at 284-87). It was agreed 
judgment would enter for AWD on AWD's claims if there were no counterclaim 
presented. (R. at 639; Tr. at pp. 3:24-25, 4:1-21). SupraNaturals represented it 
prepared the written stipulated facts. (R. at 639; Tr. at p. 4:6-9). SupraNaturals 
agreed AWD had provided materials and services for which it was not paid. (R. at 
285, % 10). SupraNaturals agreed the reasonable value of the unpaid services and 
materials provided by AWD, which improved the SupraNaturals Industrial 
Facility, was $286,054.02, subject to Defendants claim for setoff.* (Id., \ 15). 
Inherent in those facts is the finding that AWD met its basic engineering burden 
on its claims. SupraNaturals' counsel described the purpose of the arrangement as 
"sav[ing] them [AWD] from having to put on all the basic facts and wasting our 
time because we agreed on it." (R. at 639; Tr. at p. 4:19-21). Based thereon, the 
1
 Setoff is ".. .a counter-demand arising out of a transaction extrinsic to the 
plaintiffs cause of action." Law Dictionary, 440, Steven H. Gifis, ed.? Barrons (1st 
Ed., 1984). "Set-off, both at law and in equity, must be understood as that right 
which exists between two parties each of whom under an independent contract 
owes an ascertained amount to the other to set-off his respective debts by way of 
mutual deduction so that in any action brought for the larger debt, [only] the 
residue [remaining] after such deduction shall be recovered." Id. 
5 
trial court found "[t]he parties stipulated in open court that A WD would be 
entitled to recover on its claims in the absence of SupraNaturals's counterclaim." 
(R. at 388,1f 41). Therefore, A WD met its evidentiary burden, and the burden of 
proof shifted to SupraNaturals to press its counterclaim. 
A. SUPRANATURALS DID NOT OBJECT TO NOR REBUT 
THE TESTIMONY THAT AWD HIRED A LICENSED 
ENGINEER 
Even if SupraNaturals had not stipulated that AWD would be entitled to 
recover on its claims subject to set off, AWD would have met its burden of proof 
at trial based upon the record. During SupraNaturals' presentation of its 
counterclaim, AWD's president testified that a professional engineer was on staff 
at the beginning of the project. (R. at 640; pp. 267:22-25, 268:1-9). He testified 
that "[t]he calculations were done by a licensed engineer, Curtis Warhol (sic), who 
was originally on our staff at the beginning of this project, and [AWD's vice 
president] both did all the calculations." (R. at 640; pp. 262:19-21). Additionally, 
AWD's vice president testified that he worked with a "licensed PE engineer that 
[AWD] rel[ies] on every so often" and who worked for AWD. (R. at 640, pp. 
290:23-25, 291:1 -6). SupraNaturals did not object to this evidence. An objection 
to evidence not raised at trial will not be considered on appeal. Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984).2 Neither did it rebut this 
2
 As will be further argued under Section II infra, parties are not entitled to both 
the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal. State v. 
King, 2006 UT 3, f 13, 131 P.3d 202; see also, State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 
(Utah 1997). 
6 
prima facie evidence that AWD had met its engineering obligation. Once a prima 
facie case is established, the opposing party may present evidence to rebut the case 
and that party carries the burden of establishing any affirmative defenses. Welsch 
v. Smith, 113 P.3d 1284, 1289-90 (Colo. App. 2005) citing Western Distributing 
Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1992). SupraNaturals' failure to discredit 
the testimony that a licensed engineer worked with AWD on the plant design 
allowed the trial court to enter a finding that AWD met its engineering burden 
under the contract. (R. at 391, f 21). 
B. AWD'S JUDGMENT IS PROPER BECAUSE 
SUPRANATURALS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN 
OF PROOF ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM. 
SupraNaturals countersued AWD for breach of contract and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. at 51-52). A 
'counterclaim' is an independent cause of action, the purpose of which is to deduct 
from plaintiffs claim. Law Dictionary, supra, at 105. The parties' stipulation to 
forego presentation of AWD's claim vaulted SupraNaturals' counterclaim for 
damages to center stage; it placed the burden on SupraNaturals to establish its 
counterclaim or face stipulated judgment against it.3 Where a defendant 
counterclaims for damages due to the wrongful acts of a plaintiff, the defendant 
has the burden of proving the counterclaim. Lima School Dist. No. 12 v. 
3
 SupraNaturals' case benefitted by its strategic decision to stipulate to AWD's 
judgment; by doing so it shifted the judge's focus and all of the court time away 
from AWD's claims and towards its own efforts to show defects in AWD's work. 
Counsel maximized its advantage by leading the trial judge, and parties, on an out-
of-court guided tour of the SupraNaturals facility. (R. at 638). 
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Simonsen, 683 P.2d 471, 477 (Mont. 1984). Following SupraNaturals lead, the 
trial court concluded that "SupraNaturals had the burden of proof to prove that 
AWD breached the contract by providing poor quality service and products that 
did not conform to the [c]ontract requirements." (R. at 377, f 7). Ironically, 
SupraNaturals did not identify nor present any testimony of a licensed engineer to 
rebut AWD's testimony, nor, more importantly, to establish its breach of contract 
counterclaim. (R. at 380, IflJ 91, 92). After receiving all the evidence, the trial 
court ruled that "SupraNaturals failed to carry its burden of proof to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that AWD did in fact breach the contract " 
(R. at 377, H 8). Therefore, because SupraNaturals failed to establish that it was 
entitled to an offset against AWD for breach of contract or breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, the trial court correctly found AWD was entitled to 
judgment 'based upon the stipulation of the parties made in open court, as well as 
the December 2005 contract.9 (R. at 377, U 9; see also, 376, If 15; 375, % 16). 
EL SUPRANATURALS FAILED TO PRESERVE THE 
ISSUE OF AWD'S ENGINEERING OBLIGATION FOR 
APPELLATE REVIEW. 
SupraNaturals does not provide a citation to the record showing that the 
issue of AWD's engineering obligation was presented to the district court as 
required under Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.4 As a 
4
 Appellants cite only to their post-trial notice of appeal. Even the notice is void 
of any reference to the trial court record. (R. at 542-44). 
8 
general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.5 
Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, 2008 UT App 277, % 10, 191 P.3d 39, 
citing Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, \ 20, 163 P.3d 615. 
SupraNaturals conceded that AWD satisfied the May 2005 contract, including its 
engineering burden, when trial counsel stipulated to AWD's case in chief. It 
bears mentioning that this Court has cautioned practitioners that "a concession by 
trial counsel generally will prevent appellate review." Arbogast Family Trust, 
supra, at Tf 11, n. 5, citing First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State Univ., 544 
P.2d 887, 892, n. 5 (Utah 1975). SupraNaturals' regret in the outcome does not 
automatically give it a right to appeal. In order to preserve an issue for appeal, 
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has 
an opportunity to rule on that issue.6 Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 P.3d 
366; Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,1f 14, 48 P.3d 
968; DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997). Judging by its 
conduct on the record, SupraNaturals did not share its perception with the trial 
court that reversible error was occurring during the proceedings. Encouraging 
counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error at 
5
 In fact, this failure may be sufficient for the appellate court to exercise its 
discretion not to address the issue on appeal. See, Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 
2009 UT 40, Tf 37, n. 37, 216 P.3d 944 citing Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
6
 The Supreme Court has set forth three factors that help determine whether the 
trial court had such an opportunity: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely 
fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 
966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). In this case, SupraNaturals has failed to show it 
did any one of the three. 
9 
the time of its occurrence fortifies the long-established policy that the trial court 
should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error.7 A party may not 
claim to have preserved an issue for appeal by merely mentioning an issue without 
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Pratt, supra, If 15, 
citing State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,1f 33, 122 P.3d 543. During the trial, 
SupraNaturals never argued nor presented evidence that AWD failed to meet its 
engineering burden under the contract. Therefore, the trial court had no 
meaningful opportunity to consider this issue. Finally, for sake of argument, even 
if the court committed some sort of error—a conclusion AWD vigorously 
opposes—SupraNaturals cannot justifiably appeal such error where it 
affirmatively encouraged the error. A party who invites error cannot later raise 
that error on appeal. Pratt, supra, % 16. Consequently, this court should decline to 
review any issues subsumed in the parties' stipulation.8 
7
 State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 54, 70 P.3d 111; State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996); Pratt, supra, at f 17, citing State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 
f 14, 128 P.3d mi; see also, State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, If 10, 46 P.3d 230 
(requiring preservation of an issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial 
for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails); State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (policy discourages parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201, 202 (Utah 1983) (dispositive 
circumstance necessary to preserve claimed error for appellate review is timely 
objection at trial). 
8
 The appellate court will decline to engage in even a plain error review 
when "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] 
court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." Pratt, supra, at ^ f 16, 
citing State v. Winfield, supra, at f 14 quoting State v. Hamilton, supra, at f 54 
(alteration in original). Affirmative representations that a party has no objections 
to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such 
10 
A. SUPRANATURALS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT AWD MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF 
To successfully attack a trial courts' findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. Encon Utah, LLC v. 
Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,1f 46, 210 P.3d 263 citing Ockey v. 
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ^ 34 n. 32, 189 P.3d 5\;see also, Bluffdale Mountain 
Homes v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, f 52, 167 P.3d 1016 quoting 
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, % 9, 144 P.3d 1147. Here, 
SupraNaturals failed to meet the standard marshalling requirement despite 
spending the bulk of its brief revisiting its arguments on the weight of trial 
testimony.9 Throughout its entire brief, SupraNaturals omits any reference 
to the written stipulated facts it prepared. Glaringly absent is any 
disclosure of the colloquy with the trial court admitting A WD's judgment 
without AWD having to put on evidence. To fail to mention any of those 
facts belies a genuine marshalling of the evidence in light of the trial 
court's express reliance on "the stipulation of the parties made in open 
representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further 
consideration of the issues. State v. Winfield, supra, at \ 16. 
9
 The marshalling requirement is not satisfied if the parties just list all the 
evidence presented at trial, or simply rehash the arguments on evidence they 
represented at trial. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App. 233, \ 21, 217 P.3d 733 
citing Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 12, 51 P.3d 724, cert denied, 59 P.3d 
603 (Utah 2002). 
11 
court" as the basis for ultimately rending the very judgment SupraNaturals 
appeals. (R. at 377, ^  9). Marshalling evidence, for the purpose of 
challenging factual findings on appeal, requires counsel to present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists, 
and, after constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence, which must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the trial court's finding 
resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. Kimball v. Kimball, supra, 
at Tf 20, n. 5. Obviously, SupraNaturals has not disclosed significant 
material facts supporting the trial court's decision. Consequently, this 
Court may decline to reach the issues on appeal because SupraNaturals has 
not met its marshalling duty, which is a condition to appellate court review 
of factual inquiries. 
B. AWD TAKES NO POSITION ON SUPRANATURALS' 
CHALLENGE TO THE AMENDED POST-TRIAL 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND ORDER 
SupraNaturals unnecessarily argues that its claims on appeal may be 
precluded based upon one interpretation of the April 13, 2009, supersedeas 
bond order. Whether its claim on appeal is precluded as premature or not is 
of very little import to AWD. AWD does not assert that the appeal was 
premature. If the appellate court believes that the appeal was not timely 
12 
filed, then AWD has no objection to dismissal of the appeal based on such 
determination. 
SupraNaturals timely objected to the order approving attorney's fees, 
costs, interest and supersedeas bond. (R. at 493-96). Thereafter, the trial 
court entered an order specifically clarifying that a final judgment against 
SupraNaturals had been entered. (R. at 597-601). The subsequent order 
expressly states the Amended Order had been entered on March 11, 2009. 
(R. at 598, ^ f 5). Moreover, counsel for SupraNaturals expressly approved 
the form of the order. (R. at 598). Consequently, no prejudice exists to 
SupraNaturals. AWD takes no position on the effect of the validity of the 
Notice of Appeal, based upon its filing date, in light of the foregoing facts, 
as the date of the filing of appeal does not have a bearing on the substantive 
issues on appeal. u AWD does not seek to prevail based merely on an issue 
of timely filing; but is entitled to prevail on the merits. 
C. AWD IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL BY REASON THAT IT WAS 
AWARDED FEES BELOW. 
AWD is entitled to an award of attorney fees in defending SupraNaturals' 
appeal. When a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the 
party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. Arbogast Family 
11
 SupraNaturals did not post a $821,308 bond. Instead, it paid AWD 
approximately $500,835 of the $504,583 judgment presumably to stop efforts to 
collect on the judgment. (R. at 583-87). 
13 
Trust v. River Crossings, supra, at ^ f 10, citing generally, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998); see also, Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 
1f29, 181 P.3d 791.13 A provision for payment of attorney fees in a contract 
includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial. 
Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406,409 (Utah 1980). 
SupraNaturals does not appeal the trial court's award of attorney fees below. An 
award of attorney fees is proper. Consequently, AWD is entitled to its attorney 
fees incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, and for the aforementioned reasons, AWD requests this 
Court affirm the trial court's decision of November 14, 2008, and the amended 
decree of foreclosure, order of sale and judgment dated March 11,2009. AWD 
asserts the March 11, 2009, amended order is a final judgment for purposes of 
SupraNaturals' Notice of Appeal. Hence, AWD does not assert SupraNaturals5 
appeal is premature and therefore AWD takes no position on SupraNaturals' 
challenge to the March 13, 2009, post-trial supersedeas bond order. Finally, 
AWD requests a judgment for attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
13
 Because SupraNaturals did not disclose to this court in its brief in any manner 
whatsoever the parties' stipulation, AWD incurred fees on appeal in doing so. 
Attorney fees can be awarded as damages where a party is not forthright in 
presentation of the relevant portions of the record in trial court proceedings. 
DeBry v. Cascade Enters., supra, 938 P.2d at 502. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney 
fees on this basis as well. 
14 
Dated this 18th day of March, 2010. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Guy L. BlacP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
ADDENDUM 
1. Stipulated Facts. 
2. Excerpt from Trial Transcript, pp. 3-5. 
3. Objection. 
4. Order (Decision dated 3/16/09). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be delivered to the U.S. Mails, first 
class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the forgoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, together with a Courtesy Brief on CD, on this 1*1 day of March, 
2010, to the following: 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, LC 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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ADDENDUM 1 
RLED 
Fourth Jud»eia4 D.'sirjct Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
ts-o 
.Deputy 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Fax: (801) 375-3865 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AWD SALES AND SERVICE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUPRANATURALS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; TEM PROPERTIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; THOMAS 
E. MOWER, an individual; and DOES 1-X, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
Case No. 070400206 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
The parties stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation doing business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, SupraNaturals, LLC, is a Utah limited liability company doing 
business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant, TEM Properties, LLC, is a Utah limited liability company doing 
business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
0002S 
4. Defendant, Thomas R Mower, is an individual and a resident of Utah County, 
State of Utah. 
5. The transactions and events that are the subject of this case occurred principally in 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
6. During May, 2005, Plaintiff, AWD Sales and Service, Inc., and Defendant, 
SupraNaturals, LLC, entered into a contract ("Contract") (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) for 
Plaintiff to perform certain services and provide certain materials for 
SupraNaturals, LLC. In return for such materials and services, said Defendant 
agreed to pay Plaintiff certain sums. The Contract is valid and legally binding on 
the parties. 
7. During May, 2005, Defendant, Thomas Mower, executed a personal guarantee, 
and agreed to pay and guarantee payment to Plaintiff of all amounts owed Plaintiff 
under the Contract between Plaintiff and SupraNaturals, LLC. 
8. The Contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, SupraNaturals, LLC, provided that 
Plaintiff is entitled to interest on unpaid amounts owed Plaintiff under the parties' 
contract, at the rate of one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month. 
9. The Contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, SupraNaturals, LLC provided that 
Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and costs of court in the event of Defendants' 
failure to pay amounts owed Plaintiff for its labor and materials. 
2 
000236 
10. Plaintiff has provided materials and services to Defendant, SupraNaturals, LLC, 
for which it has not been paid, in the sum of $286,054.02. 
11 • Defendants, SupraNaturals, LLC and Thomas E. Mower, have failed to pay the 
amounts claimed owing Plaintiff. 
12- Plaintiff provided services to the Defendant, SupraNaturals, LLC, at 
SupraNaturals' Industrial Facility located at 1325 West Industrial Circle, 
Springville, Utah 84663-3 074, more specifically described in Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
13. Plaintiff filed a preliminary notice under Section 38-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 
within twenty days after commencement of its work on the facility. 
14. Defendant, SupraNaturals, LLC is an "owner-builder" under Section 38-01-1, et. 
seg. .on the aforementioned SupraNaturals Industrial Facility. 
15. The reasonable value of the unpaid services and materials provided by Plaintiff, 
which improved the SupraNaturals Industrial Facility during the period of May 
13,2005 through October 29,2006, was $286,054.02 subject to Defendants claim 
for setoff. 
16. Plaintiff caused a statutory Notice of Lien to be duly filed in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder on December 6,2006 in this matter. 
17. Plaintiff caused a true and correct copy of the Notice of Lien to be sent to 
3 
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Defendants, including TEM Properties, Inc. 
18. Defendants received the Notice of Lien on or about December 7,2006. 
19. To date, the amount claimed on the Notice of Lien remains unpaid. 
20. Plaintiff is priority claimant entitled to payment, and Plaintiffs claim relates back 
in time to date of commencement on the project. 
The parties stipulate that Plaintiffs exhibits are admitted without the need for Plaintiff to 
provide any foundation or evidence of admissibility, except for Exhibit 5 and 16 (Exhibits "e" 
and "p" from the Plaintiffs Pretrial Disclosures.) 
DA1ED this 5 _ day of September, 2008. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Approved as to Form 
Steprfem O^ie^nbeny 
Ajtorykyfaj?Defendants 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
000284 
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P R O C E E D I N G 5 
(Electronically recorded on September 5, 2008) 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise. Fourth District Court is 
now in session, the Honorable Steven Hansen presiding. 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning. 
MR. GREENWOOD: Good morning. 
THE COURT: We'll call the case that's scheduled for 
trial, AW Sales and Service vs. SupraNaturals, LLC; Ten 
Properties, LLC; and Thomas E. Mower. All those who are present, 
participating and sitting at Counsel table, tell me who you are 
and state your names for the record. 
MR. BLACK: Guy Black on behalf of AWD, and I'm 
accompanied by Mr. Jones, who will be the representative of AWD 
at the table. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GREENWOOD: Chris Greenwood, co-Counsel for the 
plaintiff. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Steve Quesenberry. I'm Counsel for 
all the defendants. 
MR. HADFIELD: Phil Hadfield, your Honor, corporate 
Counsel for one of the plaintiffs, Supranatural. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Are both sides ready to 
proceed this morning? 
MR. BLACK: We are, your Honor. We've reached an 
agreement, or we have a set of stipulated facts that I believe, 
1 
2 
. 3 
4 
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10 
11 
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14 
15 
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19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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if I'm not mistaken — Counsel can correct me — the stipulated 
facts would be sufficient absent — if there was no counterclaim 
presented, they would be sufficient to allow judgment to enter 
for the plaintiff on plaintiff's claims. That's been signed by 
both attorneys, if I may approach. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Quesenberry, you 
prepared this document, so obviously you're stipulating to these 
facts? 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Yeah, your Honor. these are just 
the foundational facts. The parties are who they are, we had 
a contract. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: They billed us for this. They're — 
you know, they followed the lien procedure correctly. Basically, 
you know, it's just subject to our counterclaim, our setoff — 
our claim for damages, which you'll' see in that. It's one of the 
paragraphs — oh, paragraph 15, subject to our claims for setoff. 
THE COURT: Correct. Okay. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: So it-jus,t saves them from having to 
put on all the basic 
on it. 
THE COURT: 
MR. BLACK: 
the Court. 
THE COURT: 
facts and wasting our time because we agreed \ 
I'll note that for the record, then. 
Your Honor, I also have an exhibit book for 
Okay. 
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MR. 
exception of 
THE 
I guess it's 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
BLACK: Plaintiff's exhibits. I believe with 
two of them, they have all — 
COURT: I have one already that's been presented. 
— 
BLACK: That's the defendants, I believe. 
COURT: All right. 
QUESENBERRY: Your Honor, we'd just stipulate to 
~
5
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admissibility of all of them except for two. I think it's No. 5 
and 13. 
MR. BLACK: Actually, I think they're all admitted, 
right? Isn't that what we're saying? 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Yeah. 
MR. BLACK: They're all admitted except for No. 5 and 
13. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. So we'll proceed, then, on the 
defendant's counterclaim; is that right? 
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, we would like to put on two 
witnesses just briefly. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BLACK: One witness is Mr. Gary Chlarson. He's 
technically defendant's witness and/or a rebuttal witness for us. 
He has his daughter's wedding that he wants to prepare for, and 
we promised him that we would take him first thing. I've spoken 
to opposing Counsel and he's in agreement with me proceeding with 
ADDENDUM 3 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
CHARLES L. PERSCHON (11149) 
JORDAN K. CAMERON (12051) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C 
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84604-5663 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Facsimile (801) 375-3865 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AWD SALES AND SERVICE, INC., a Utah 
corporation 
Plaintiff, 
V o . 
SUPRANATURALS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; TEM PROPERTIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, THOMAS 
E. MOWER, an individual; and DOES 1 -X, | 
Defendants. 
! OBJECTION TO ORDER APPROVING 
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, INTEREST 
AND SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Case No. 070400206 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Defendants, by and through counsel, object to the above-captioned Order Approving 
Attorney Fees, Costs, Interest and Supersedeas Bond ("Order") on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff 
references and applies joint and several liability to each aspect of the Order and (2) not every 
Defendant was a party to every claim for relief. 
000436 
First, the Utah Legislature eliminated joint and several liability through the Utah Liability 
Reform Act, which is codified in the Utah Code §§ 78B-5-817 to 823. See Yirak v. Dan's Super 
Market, 188 P.3d 487,488 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). Under Utah's liability reform statutes, "the 
maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to that defendant" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-820. In its Order, Plaintiff states that 
judgment should be ordered against "Defendants, SupraNaturals, LLC and Thomas E. Mower, 
jointly and severally." (Order, 4). 
Such an order contravenes the liability laws of Utah. It is well established that "defendant 
ought to be on the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor 
for everyone else's damages." Nat 7 Service Industries Inc. v. B. W. Norton Manufacturing Co., 
937 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Citing Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 
884 (Utah 1993). It is a reversible error for the trial court to order an award based on joint and 
several liability. See Famers Insurance Exchange v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). Here, the court should only order an award proportionate to the aimount of fault 
attributable to each defendant, pursuant to Utah Liability Reform Act. 
Second, the Complaint alleges three claims for relief against various defendants. The 
Plaintiff did not bring every cause against every defendant. Specifically, in Plaintiffs first claim 
for Lien Foreclosure, Plaintiff sought relief against all Defendants. (Compl. On Plaintiffs First 
Claim \ 2). In Plaintiffs second claim for Breach of Contract, Plaintiff sought relief against 
00049E 
SupraNaturals only. (Compl. On Plaintiffs Second Claim f 1). Likewise, in its third claim for 
Indebtedness of Guarantor, Plaintiff sought relief against Thomas Mower only. (Compl. On 
Plaintiffs Third Claim f l ) . 
In the Order Plaintiff seeks to attribute liability under each claim to each defendant jointly 
and severally. Plaintiff also seeks an Order making each Defendant fully liable for attorney fees, 
costs, interest and judgment under each claim for relief. Such an Order is unsupported by the law 
and the pleadings in this case. Again, the Court should attribute to each Defendant a percentage 
of fault for every aspect of the Order and judgment and the Order should stay within the confines 
of those limitations. 
For these reasons, Defendant objects to this Order and requests that the Court decline to 
issue this Order. 
DATED this J ? day of February, 2009. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perscnon 
Jordan K, Cameron 
Attorneys for Defendants 
000494 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
//Vv 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the C\ day of February 2009 she caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO ORDER APPROVING ATTORNEY 
FEES, COSTS, INTEREST AND SUPERSEDEAS BOND to be delivered to the following: 
Mr. Chris D. Greenwood 
Greenwood & Black 
1840 North State Street 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Sent Via: 
Hand-Delivery 
Facsimile 
y? Mailed (postage prepaid) 
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ADDENDUM 4 
CHRIS D. GREENWOOD, No. 6234 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AWD SALES AND SERVICE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUPRANATURALS, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; TEM 
PROPERTIES, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; THOMAS E. 
MOWER, an individual, and 
DOES 1 to X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER (Decision dated 3/16/09) 
Civil No. 070400206 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 
This matter came before the court on Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs order 
approving attorney fees, costs, interest, and supersedeas bond, filed on February 10, 2009. 
Plaintiff filed its response to Defendants' objection on February 18,2009. The Court 
reviewed the pleadings and the arguments of counsel regarding the objection. After 
0006! 
ORDER (Decision dated 3/16/09), 
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consideration, the court concludes the Defendants' objection is not well taken and issued a 
written decision without a hearing in the matter. 
Based upon the court's decision, and good cause appearing, it is HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff s Amended Decree of Foreclosure, Order of Sale and Judgment, 
("Amended Order") prepared by counsel on January 30,2009, and submitted 
to opposing counsel provides for joint and several liability against Defendants 
SupraNaturals, LLC, and Thomas E. Mower, in the amount of $286,052.02 
plus interest at the rate of 1.5% per month, compounded monthly, beginning 
September 30, 2006, until paid. In addition, Plaintiffs Order Approving 
Attorney Fees, Costs, Interest and Supercedeas Bond similarly attributes joint 
and several liability to SupraNaturals, LLC and Thomas E. Mower on this 
amount and the interest that has accrued. The Court finds that counsel 
prepared these orders in accord with the Court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Defendants' obj ection to the entry of an order approving 
attorney fees, costs, interest, and supercedeas bond has no basis in the law or 
the facts of this case and is hereby denied. 
2. Defendants, SupraNaturals, LLC and Thomas E. Mower are presently 
obligated to the above amount and the interest based upon the Court's 
decisions and upon the entry of the Amended Decree of Foreclosure, Order of 
Sale and Judgment. Specifically, SupraNaturals, LLC, and Thomas E. 
no Pi r n n 
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AWD Sales and Services, Inc. vs. SupraNaturals, el al, Civil No. 070400206 Page 2 of 5 
Mower are jointly and severally liable for this amount because SupraNaturals, 
LLC signed a time and materials compensation agreement and Thomas E. 
Mower signed an unconditional guaranty, both of which entitle Plaintiff to 
payment of the above amount and the interest. Defendants5 contention that 
the aforementioned order violations the Utah Liability Reform Act is not well 
taken. Clearly, the liability of both SupraNaturals, LLC, and Thomas E. 
Mower arise from contract and therefore outside the purview of the Utah 
Liability Reform Act as explicitly stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-823 
(2008). The Reform act does not affect claims "arising from statute, contract, 
or agreement". Id. 
3. In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to award of attorney fees and costs against all 
Defendants, including TEM Properties, LLC, jointly and severally, in 
preparing, recording and enforcing its lien pursuant to sections 38-1-17 and -
18 of Utah Code Annotated, and on the basis of prevailing on its lien 
foreclosure claim. 
4. The court finds it is not necessary to include prospective attorney fees 
incurred on appeal in the order approving the amount of the supercedeas bond. 
If an appeal is taken and Plaintiff prevails, Plaintiffwi.il be protected against 
loss or damage occasioned by appeal through an award of attorney fees and 
costs from the appellate court. 
00053 
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The Amended Order was entered of recorded on March 11,2009. 
DATED THIS ^ d a y of IA/UJLA^ ^ - , 2009. 
\V* 
BY THE Cm^\m^i--^-
Approved as to form 
for Defendants 
DISTRICT COUI 2j*gE 
I# 
ORDER (Decision dated 3/16/09), 
AWD Sales and Services, Inc. vs. SupraNaturals, et. ai, Civil No. 070400206 
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
To: Stephen Quesenberry, Attorney for Defendants 
Please take notice that the foregoing ORDER (Decision dated 3/16/09) shall be 
submitted to the Court for signing within the time prescribed pursuant to Rule 7 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure in this matter unless approved by counsel prior to that time. 
Dated this _£^_ day of April, 2009. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE: 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed, U.S. Mail, first class, prepaid 
postage, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER (Decision dated 3/16/09), on this 
2 - day of April, 2009 to the following: 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Attorney for Defendants 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
&beiretaiy 
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